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1 Richard Routley/Sylvan
1.1 The year was 1980 and, at the end of one of the so-called ‘Logic Minicon-
ferences’ held at the Australian National University (ANU), someone decided
to take a picture of the participants. Many of them stand right in front of a
blackboard, pens and papers are abandoned on a table near a backpack, and
the sun casts rays of warm light on their clothes. With a bit of imagination,
it is possible to smell the aroma of a cup of coffee or hear someone suggesting
that the discussion be carried on at the pub. Errol Martin hides his hands be-
hind his back, Ross Brady smiles at the camera, Chris Mortensen has a long
beard, while Graham Priest leans on a lectern. Bob Meyer laughs. Then,
front left, there is Richard Routley (or Sylvan to which he later changed his
name).1
In this picture, Richard sits on a chair: he wears a shirt, the legs are
crossed, and his hands rest on his knees. The look in his eyes seems to
convey the impression of a strong man who refuses to compromise on what
he believes in. And, indeed, his whole life was perfectly consistent with
this impression. He did refuse to compromise with Blackwells about the
publication of his MA thesis and, consequently, he never carried out the
necessary revisions.2 He did refuse to compromise with Princeton University
because he thought that his research was not properly supported: for this
reason, he left the institution without completing his doctoral studies.3 He
did refuse to compromise about his ethical principles by working in a tent,
in isolation from city life, lost in the forest on Plumwood Mountain.4 The
long list goes on.
1.2 Having said that, it is important to remember that Richard’s character,
1In the picture, we can also see McRobbie and Slaney.
2Richard’s MA thesis was entitled Moral Scepticism and it was unusually long (385
pages). Arthur Prior, one of the examiners, confessed that “he’d given it a mark of 95%,
but this was not so much a mark as an exclamation mark” (see Hyde 2001, fn. 5).
3This is how Richard describes his period at Princeton University: “As a brash young
man I set out from New Zealand for Princeton University . . . . [My research] project was
hardly enthusiastically welcomed at Princeton, and I made comparatively little progress
on it there . . . ” (Sylvan 2000, p. 7). Nevertheless, many years later, encouraged by David
Lewis, he submitted the first 200 pages of Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond as a
doctoral thesis. Princeton awarded him a PhD in 1981.
4Hyde (forthcoming, p. 13) tells us that, from 1975 to 1980, Richard lived in a tent,
then a small shed. In the meanwhile, he was building one his stone houses on Plumwood
Mountain, 100 kms east of Canberra.
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no. 1
27
as strong and uncompromising as it was, never forbade him to work with
collaborators. On the contrary, from the beginning to the end of his career,
Richard was always part of important research groups. Two of them were
particularly relevant for the development of his philosophy. The first was the
New England Group. After spending two years working at Sydney University
(from 1962 to 1964), Richard moved to the University of New England, New
South Wales. Here, he helped David Londey and Len Goddard lay the foun-
dation of, not only the first Australian Master’s course in logic, but also a
philosophical community able to influence a whole generation of Australian
logicians. Over four years, the New England Group, originally composed
of only Richard, Londey and Goddard, grew very rapidly, to include Ross
Brady, Martin Bunder, Malcolm Rennie, and Val Mcrae, who, later on was
to become Richard’s wife.
Gathered together in what Goddard describes as “a rural community
whose dominating interests were in sheep ticks and wool” (1992, p. 174),
these researchers maintained a fruitful academic life focused on the problems
faced by classical logic, and on the possibility of solving them by develop-
ing non-classical formal tools. As Richard himself writes, the work of the
New England Group was “heavily philosophically oriented” and mainly con-
cerned with “modal logic”, “theories of implication”, “relevant logics”, and
“logical paradoxes” (Routley 1984, p. 133). However, during this period,
two collaborations had a decisive influence on Richard. On the one hand,
the collaboration with Goddard produced important results in the field of
significance logic – results that culminated in the publication of a 600-page
monograph entitled The Logic of Significance and Context (1973).5 On the
other hand, the collaboration with Val Routley (later, Plumwood) pushed
Richard to realize his deep dissatisfaction with what he called the Ontolog-
ical Assumption, that is, that nothing true can be said about non-existent
objects. Such a dissatisfaction would soon turn out to be Richard’s main
reason to develop his noneist theory.6
1.3 From his arrival at the University of New England, four years had passed.
5As we learn from Hyde (2001, fn. 12), there were also parts of an unfinished manuscript
which was meant to be Part 2 of The Logic of Significance and Context. Unfortunately,
this was never completed.
6For historical clarity, it may be helpful to note that Richard started to present his
ideas about non-existent objects publicly around the beginning of 1965. However, in 1964,
he had already submitted his first paper on the matter to a journal. Later on, this paper
was published under the title ‘Some things do not exist’ (1966b).
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At the beginning of 1968, Richard decided to leave there, and to accept a
Senior Research Fellowship at Monash University. However, after only three
years of intense research on non-classical logic and, in particular, on relevant
logics, Richard decided to move again, joining the Department of Philos-
ophy of the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National
University (ANU). From the time he arrived there, and being supported by
the Head of Department, Jack (J. J. C.) Smart, Richard began to create a
second research community – the well-known Canberra Group. Some of the
people that joined this project were former members of the New England
Group (e.g., Malcolm Rennie, Ross Brady, and Val Routley). Len Goddard
(by then in St Andrews) became a regular visitor to the ANU as well. The
group had also new acquisitions (e.g., Bob Meyer, Chris Mortensen, and Gra-
ham Priest), research students (e.g., Michael McRobbie, Errol Martin, and
John Slaney) and many frequent visitors (e.g., Nuel Belnap, Michael Dunn,
Newton da Costa, and Alasdair Urquhart).
Needless to say, this environment was unbelievably exciting. Goddard
writes that, at the ANU, “it was raining logicians and [people had] been
caught without an umbrella” (1992, p. 178). True! However, while it was
certainly raining cats and dogs (and logicians too!), Richard’s ideas were
flooding up as well. First of all, in collaboration with Bob Meyer, he wrote
an impressive series of papers which were meant to provide semantics for a
wide range of relevant logics (1972a, 1972b, 1972c, 1972d, 1989). The main
achievements of this collaboration were collected in Relevant Logic and their
Rivals (1982). Secondly, Richard strengthened his critiques of the Ontolog-
ical Assumption by endorsing some of the core ideas of Alexius Meinong
with the aim of developing his own theory of non-existent objects. Con-
cerning this topic, Richard published a considerable number of important
papers (1979a, 1982); nonetheless, his masterpiece remains the monumental
Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond: an Investigation of Noneism and
the Theory of Items (1980). Finally, around 1976, Richard started to be
attracted by the idea that reality was contradictory. Not long afterwards,
the attraction was turned into commitment by the arrival of Graham Priest
in the group. He and Priest endorsed the metaphysical position which they
called dialetheism: namely, the view that some (but not all) contradictions
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are true.7
1.4 This is enough of what happened inside the walls of academia. What
about outside of them? Well, of course, the world kept rolling and, while
Richard was busy trying to save Meinong’s jungle from the Quinean foresters,
another kind of forester was threatening the beautiful Australian landscape.
So, Richard decided to fight them too. Around 1973, his work, together
with the work of the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, introduced an in-
novative approach to environmental ethics. Moreover, in their Fight for the
Forest (1973), Richard and Val directly attacked the Australian environ-
mental policy being applied by the government, with economic, social, and
environmental objections. As Hyde reminds us, the impact of this book was
so radical that the former Head of the Commonwealth Forestry Economics
Research Unit, Neil Byron, declared: “it angered the foresters that two people
who had never studied economics or forestry could produce the most inci-
sive and devastating economic analysis of forestry . . . in Australia” (Hyde
forthcoming, p. 11; also in Byron 1999, p. 53).8
Richard was firmly convinced that there is no fundamental moral differ-
ence between human beings, often mistakenly taken to be the center of the
universe, and the natural world, wrongly treated as a resource ready to be
exploited. According to Richard, the environment includes the human be-
ings: protecting, saving, understanding and fighting for the natural world is
protecting, saving, understanding and fighting for human beings too. For this
reason, his passion for the environment was anything but theoretical: this
was no detached study of nature, but a deep way of experiencing and living
in it. Richard knew the names of all the trees, flowers, grasses and seeds; he
7For a long time, Richard was agnostic about the consistency of the world. He writes:
“the question of the consistency of the world cannot be conclusively resolved” (Routley
and Meyer 1976, p.20). However, in 1976, he endorsed a dialectical position, or what
is currently called dialetheism. He also claims that one of the benefits of a dialectical
position is the possibility of “return[ing] to something like the grand simplicity of naive
set theory . . . . [W]e should arrive back guided by a dialectical theory which reassembles
the intuitive data” (Routley 1979b, p. 302).
8The importance of Richard’s work is noticed by the environmental historian William
Lines as well. He writes: “The Routleys [Richard and Valerie] were unique. They
challenged conventional academic boundaries as barriers to understanding and dismissed
claims to objectivity as spurious attempts to protect vested interests. They exposed both
wood-chopping and plantation forestry as uneconomic, dependent on taxpayer subsidies,
and driven largely by a rampant development ideology. ” (Lines 2006, pp. 144 – 45).
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enjoyed to walk and swim.9 He loved long and adventurous explorations, the
last of which happened in Indonesia.
1.5 It was the 16th of June 1996. Richard was in Bali with Louise, his
second wife. They were meant to visit Pura Besakih, a temple, both Hindu
and Buddhist. That morning, he woke up at 5 am: he ate bananas and
eggs, enjoyed the good weather, and took a swim in the lake nearby. Then,
right after entering through the main gate of the temple, he died, quite
unexpectedly, killed by a heart attack. As explicitly requested by Richard
himself, he was buried in the forest, looking out over the sea. He was 59
years old, and he left the world in a way opposite to the way in which he had
lived it – quietly, in silence, and with no noise.
The same people that, 16 years before, during one of the many ‘Logic
Miniconferences’ held at ANU, were smiling in front of the camera, would
have never been able to guess that Richard would die so young. His heart,
full of passion and energy, seemed to be unfailable. Priest: “[Richard’s]
vigour had been palpable. He was still in full cry, working on his numerous
philosophical projects. . . . Every day he would write from about dawn till
lunch-time. Then he would go and carry bricks, move beams, dig foundations.
It just didn’t seem possible that this body had a heart that could give out.
Suddenly. Just like that. But it had” (Priest 2016, p. 125). The ultimate
Australian iconoclast was gone.10
2 What you can find in this volume
2.1 From what we have said up to now, it should be clear that Richard’s
philosophy is unbelievably rich. However, a natural way to make his vast
production accessible is to divide it into three main topics of research: (1)
metaphysics, (2) logic, and (3) environmental theory. This special issue col-
lects 20 contributions on Richard’s work, and one unpublished set of notes
written by Richard himself. 6 papers are concerned with metaphysics, 11 pa-
9During the Memorial Gathering for Richard, Goddard describes Richard’s relation
with nature in this way: “[Richard] took such a delight in nature, not so much the delight
that a romantic might take in the overall beauty of it all, but a delight in its richness and
complexity, in the detail that he found in the structure of mosses and in the behavior of
insects”.
10Routley/Sylvan’s unpublished work is now held at the library of the University of
Queensland in Brisbane.
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pers are concerned with logic, and 3 papers are about environmental theory.
Given the wide range of topics discussed, we believe that the readers might
need a little help concerning orientation. Before entering into the jungle, any
good explorer needs a map, and this is what follows.
2.2 Let’s begin with the metaphysical part of Richard’s production. As we
already mentioned in 1.2, Richard was convinced that the so-called Onto-
logical Assumption (nothing true can be said about non-existent objects) is
wrong.11 At the end of the day, it seem to be evident that it is possible to
make true statements about what does not exist. Sherlock Holmes does not
exist but he is truly a smart detective (at least in Doyle’s stories). Pinocchio
does not exist, but he is truly a liar (in Collodi’s story). Someone might even
say that number 2 is a non-existent object, and, still, it is truly prime. For
this reason, Richard aimed at “a very general theory of all items (objects)
whatsoever: of those that are intesional and those that are not, of those that
exist and those that do not, of those that are possible and those that are not,
of those that are paradoxical or defective and those that are not, of those
that are non-significant or absurd and of those that are not; it is a theory of
the logic and properties and kinds of properties of all these items” (Routley
1980, pp. 5 – 6).
Richard believed that a theory able to achieve such a goal is Meinong’s
Theory of Objects. He writes: “Meinong’s theory provides a coherent scheme
for talking and reasoning about all items, not just those which exist, with-
out the necessity for distorting or unworkable reductions; and in doing so
it attributes . . . features to nonentities [namely objects that do not exist]”
(Routley 1980, pp. iv – v). Following the Meinongian jargon, we can say that
Richard accepts Meinong’s Principle of Aussersein: the Sosein of an object
(the set of properties satisfied by the object) is independent of its Sein (be-
ing). Prima facie, this idea seems unacceptable; however, this is not the case.
In this volume, Plebani successfully argues that, working in the framework
defended by Stephen Yablo and many others, the Principle of Aussersein can
be accepted by philosophers that are not necessarily Meinongian, as well.
Of course, Richard did not simply rephrase Meinong’s ideas. On the con-
trary, in order to overcome the well-known difficulties faced by the Theory
11As Hyde suggests (2001, fn. 17), Richard explicitly rejected the Ontological Assump-
tion in print for the first time in ‘Non-existence does not exist’ (1970). However, the
rejection of the Ontological Assumption was probably made by Richard way before, since
the same paper was already under submission in 1965.
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of Objects, he defended an updated version of Meinong’s ontology (called
noneism) which relies on the distinction between nuclear (characterizing)
and extra-nuclear (non-characterizing) properties. A similar approach to
Meinong has been endorsed by many other philosophers (e.g. Parsons 1980;
Jacquette 2015) and it usually goes under the name of ‘nuclear Meinongian-
ism’. Unfortunately, Richard’s nuclear Meinongianism has been too often
assimilated to Parsons’ positions: for this reason, the specificities of the for-
mer has not been properly considered. In this volume, Fujikawa begins to
fill this gap in the secondary literature by critically addressing some of the
under-discussed features of Routley’s noneism.12
Richard spent almost an entire working life defending noneism. In par-
ticular, he was convinced that Meinongianism can be fruitfully applied to
those fields of research in which non-existent objects are heavily employed.
“The more comprehensive case for the importance of nonetities includes . . .
their role in mathematics and their roles in theoretical explanations of sci-
ence” (Routley 1980, p. 768). Examples of nonentities are “seventeen di-
mensional spaces”, “ideal points”, “religious positions which consider God as
a non-entity” (Routley 1967, pp. 2 – 6) and, of course, fictional objects. In
this volume, some interesting applications of noneism are discussed as well.
Wigglesworth merges a modal conception of sets and noneism. Gonzalez
defends Richard’s account of universal fictions while Proudfoot discusses his
idea that a comprehensive theory of fiction is impossible. Finally, Voltolini
orients noneism towards a syncretic view of existence, according to which
existence can be captured both by means of second-order and by means of
first-order notions, which are related.13
2.3 The second part of Richard’s production is concerned with logic. As
we have already discussed in §1, right after his arrival at the University of
New England, he developed an interest in significance logics, namely formal
systems that are able to handle non-significant sentences. On the one hand,
12According to Fujikawa’s paper, given a formal treatment of the so-called supposition
operator s which employs the framework of world semantics, Richard’s nuclear Meinon-
gianism can be assimilated to Priest’s modal Meinongianism. It is interesting to notice
that, for completely different reasons, such an assimilation has been defended by Casati
as well (Casati forthcoming).
13Voltolini’s contribution contains an interesting comparison between noneism (or, more
generally, Meinongianism) and Crane’s psychological reductionism. For the readers that
are intrigued by the topic, it can be helpful to mention that a similar comparison has been
discussed by Casati and Fujikawa (2016), and Priest (2016, Ch. 14.6.1).
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he analyzed the philosophical importance of the notion of nonsense (1966a;
1969); on the other, with the help of Goddard, he modeled this philosophical
notion with the help of many-valued semantics, i.e. semantics containing the
truth-values t and f (standing for truth and falsity, respectively) and some
additional non-classical ‘algebraic’ values (1973). In this volume, Szmuc and
Omori cast a new and interesting light on these matters, merging them with
the plurivalent semantics developed by Graham Priest.14
As the years went by, Richard became more radical: he started to claim
explicitly that classical logic needs to be abandoned because “[it] has failed to
live up to its early promise as a tool for clarifying and in some cases resolving
philosophical and methodological issues” (Routley, Meyer, Plumwood, Brady
1985, p. xi). Moreover, Richard thought that the most robust alternative to
classical logic is represented by the family of relevant logics. For this reason,
Richard invested a lot of energy in developing an adequate semantics relying
on two main ideas. The first one, developed in 1969 in collaboration with Val
Routley, is the well-known star operator (∗) which was used to describe the
behavior of negation.15 In this volume, Ferguson adds an interesting piece to
the already vast literature about the star operator by exploring its relation
to the less famous mate function.
The second idea, developed around 1970, is the so-called ternary relation
R which was used to provide the truth-conditions for relevant implication
‘→’.16 Bimbo, Dunn, and Ferenz describe the genealogy of the ternary rela-
tion by commenting, in a clear and accessible way, on an unpublished work
by Richard. Both their paper and Richard’s unpublished manuscript are col-
lected in the present volume. Moreover, Ciuni, Ferguson, and Szmuc merge
Richard’s interest in significance logic with relevant logics by appealing to
the principle of Component Homogeneity.
Relevant logics, as well as many other ideas developed by Richard in the
field of both mathematical and philosophical logic, have been very fruitful.
14Szmuc and Omori’s paper has the virtue of drawing attention to Richard’s under-
considered work on the notion of nonsense. Concerning this topic, it would be interesting
to compare Richard’s account of nonsense with the more recent one discussed by Moore
(1997; 2012) and Mulhall (2015).
15Hyde explains the relation between ∗ and negation in the following way: ∼ A is true
in a set-up a iff A is false in a companion set-up world a∗, the image of a under the one-one
function ∗. For more details, see Hyde (2001, p. 189) or Mares (2012).
16Hyde explains the the truth-condition for relevant implication in the following way:
A→ B is true in a set-up a iff for all set-ups b, c in K, whenever Rabc and A is true in b
then B is true in c. For more details, see Hyde (2001, p. 190) or Mares (2012).
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For this reason, they are still being applied with great success. Some of the
papers collected in this volume discuss these applications. Brady delivers a
tour de force concerning the universe of inconsistent mathematics;17 Ramirez
discusses a non-classical approach to Bayesian confirmation theories; Tanaka
employs the semantics of relevant logics to provide a better grasp of impossi-
ble worlds; Skurt and Wansing discuss some problematic aspects of negation
as cancellation, as discussed by Richard and Val. On the more philosophical
side, Barrio and Da Ré defend a novel account of the relationship between
paraconsistency and dialetheism; da Costa and Becker investigate the rela-
tion between Richard’s views on logic, anti-exceptionalism, and pluralism.
Finally, Nolan engages with Richard’s Ultralogic Program. First of all, he
sketches how Richard addresses the demand for an all-purpose universal logic.
Secondly, he explores how it is possible to satisfy this demand without en-
dorsing a Routleyan Ultralogic as a foundational logic.18
2.4 We conclude with a brief discussion of the third and last research topic:
environmental theory. One of the main ideas defended by Richard is that
human beings have been wrongly thought to occupy a special, central and,
therefore, predominant moral position in the world. Nothing, in the whole
universe, is more important than human beings, human beings declare. One
of the corollaries of this idea is that the environment does not have any
(intrinsic) value, just the (extrinsic) one given by the fact that it can be
profitably used by human beings. For instance, the deforestation of thou-
sands and thousands of acres is bad, not because cutting trees is bad per se,
but just because the forest might help to prevent landslides that can be dan-
gerous for human beings, and so on. Moved by the idea that the environment
has (not only an extrinsic, but also) an intrinsic value, Richard decided to
challenge this chauvinistic, anthropocentric ideology. In order to do so, he
developed his famous ‘last man argument’.
In this volume, Lamb discusses in scholarly details how the ‘last man argu-
ment’ works. Moreover, since a number of environmental philosophers have
used it to draw different, sometimes even contrary, lessons, Lamb aims at
determining what this argument really shows. By drawing on a wide range
of hard-to-access papers by Sylvan, Lamb gives an account of the unique
meta-ethics that underpins his position. In another paper, Hyde defends the
importance of accepting the intrinsic value of the natural world for conserva-
17A discussion of inconsistent mathematics can be found in Mortensen (1995, 2010).
18For a beautiful introduction to Richard’s Ultralogic, see Weber (forthcoming).
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tion biology. In particular, he shows that the critiques against this position
(Macquire and Justus 2008; Justus, Colyvan, Regan and Macquire 2009)
do not succeed. Finally, Malavisi explains the extraordinary importance of
Richard’s deep-green environmental ethics. Furthermore, she passionately
argues that deep-green theory can become a relevant practice if and only if
Richard’s ideas are seriously discussed, taught and, of course, applied in our
everyday life.
3 What you cannot find in this volume
3.1 Even though the present volume covers many important topics, other
crucial ideas in Richard’s philosophy are not discussed. In particular, two im-
portant aspects of his production have been left out. The first is represented
by what Richard himself calls ‘plurallism’, namely the idea that there is more
than one actual world. In 1983, during the second paraconsistency conference
held at ANU, Richard challenged the uniqueness of the actual world for the
first time. It is not difficult to imagine the astonishment of the participants.
Later on, Richard described this idea in the following way: “Pluralism . . .
comes in two distinct forms: a theory of meta-pluralism, according to which
there are many correct theories (especially larger philosophical positions) but
at most one actual world; and radical or deep pluralism which goes to the
root of these differences in correctness to be found in things, and discerns a
plurality of actual worlds” (Sylvan 1988, p. 253).19
3.2 The second unrepresented aspect is what Hyde labels the ‘comprehen-
sive nature’ of Richard’s philosophy. It is undeniable that Richard was not
only a thinker, but also a systematic thinker. As there are paintings that
can be fully appreciate only by looking at them from a distance, in the same
way, Richard’s philosophy can be fully appreciated only by looking at it as a
whole. Only in this way, is it possible to realize that his thoughts about logic,
metaphysics, and environmental theory fit coherently together into what he
called a ‘deep theory’, that is, a broad worldview. For instance, Richard’s
19Richard’s account of pluralism was deeply connected with his political views and, in
particular, which his defense of anarchism. In Transcendental Metaphysics: From Radical
to Deep Plurallism, which represents his most developed and coherent endorsement of
pluralism, he writes: “[The] government should not be too pleased with this book. One
of the underlying aims of this text is frankly subversive. . . . It is intended, among many
other things, as a metaphysical prelude to theoretical anarchism (Sylvan 1997, p. xiii).
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anarchist political views can be understood only by assuming his views about
plurallism, and his plurallism can be understood only by assuming relevant
logics; relevant logics and, more generally, non-classical logics go hand in
hand with his endorsement of noneism, while noneism is essential to un-
derstand Richard’s sistology (theory of objects).20 In Nola’s words, Richard
tried to “put together a systematic and comprehensive deep theory, including,
among other parts, deep green theory and its practice, deep pluralism and
its regional applications, deep relevant logic and its dialectical elaborations,
all set within integrated object and process theory [deep item theory]” (Nola
1988, p. 295).
3.3 These topics, together with a number of others, are absent from this
volume. Nonetheless, we do not think this is a problem. On the contrary,
this just shows the richness and deepness of Richard’s work. For this reason,
we hope that our special issue can stimulate more interest in his philosophy:
both the academic and non-academic world still needs him. Paraphrasing
the title of the Australian novelist, Gerald Murnane, Richard’s philosophy
has a million windows. Now, we just need to look at the world through them.
***
CM and GP would like to express their sincere thanks to FC for doing most
of the hard work in the production of this volume. FC, CM and GP are
thankful for the ongoing support received by Ed Mares, editor of the AJL.
Finally, FC would also like to thank Dominic Hyde for all the enlightening
conversations and, above all, the beautiful friendship.
20This is how Hyde describes the systematic nature of Richard’s philosophy: “The re-
lation between the various parts of his ‘deep theory’ was as follows: the work on deep
pluralism was made possible . . . by the technological advances in logic he [Richard] had
long laboured to bring about, in particular the adoption of his preferred deep relevant logic;
it was couched within deep item-theory, thereby, he claimed, avoiding damaging ontologi-
cal excesses; and it provided a sound metaphysical basis for ethics, properly understood,
namely deep green theory” (Hyde 2001, p. 199).
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